Abstract. At Eurocrypt'04, Freedman, Nissim and Pinkas introduced a fuzzy private matching problem. The problem is defined as follows. Given two parties, each of them having a set of vectors where each vector has T integer components, the fuzzy private matching is to securely test if each vector of one set matches any vector of another set for at least t components where t < T . In the conclusion of their paper, they asked whether it was possible to design a fuzzy private matching protocol without incurring a communication complexity with the factor T t . We answer their question in the affirmative by presenting a protocol based on homomorphic encryption, combined with the novel notion of a share-hiding error-correcting secret sharing scheme, which we show how to implement with efficient decoding using interleaved Reed-Solomon codes. This scheme may be of independent interest. Our protocol is provably secure against passive adversaries, and has better efficiency than previous protocols for certain parameter values.
Introduction
In Eurocrypt'04, Freedman, Nissim and Pinkas (FNP) [4] introduced the private fuzzy matching problem. The problem is defined for two parties. Each party holds a set of vectors, where each vector has its length equal to T . The number of vectors in the two sets are m and n, respectively. The fuzzy private matching of the two sets computes the intersection of two sets by considering a match if any pair of vectors from both sets has at least t out of T common components (t < T ). The computation must preserve the privacy of the sets, i.e. the other party learns no more than the result of the operation.
This error-tolerance property is useful in many applications. For example, database entries are not always accurate or full (e.g. due to errors, omissions, or inconsistent spellings), for example, in the case of biometric pattern matching. Due to the human error and error-prone biometric systems, it would be useful to have an algorithm still reporting a match if two datasets are similar within a threshold.
T t subsets of t shares until the correct subset is found and the secret is recovered (assuming that the correct secret can be identified). The idea of an error-correcting threshold t-of-T secret sharing scheme is to add additional redundancy to the shares of the secret, such that the correct secret can be efficiently recovered (in time polynomial in T ) even in the 'noisy' setting above, where an unknown subset of t of T given shares are correct and the rest are random. At the same time, we also require a share hiding privacy property: when there are < t correct shares the above 'noisy' vector of T shares gives no information on the position of the correct shares. This problem naturally leads to consider error correcting codes to perform this decoding. As we explain, although the Shamir t-of-T secret sharing scheme can also be viewed as a Reed Solomon error correcting code, it does not quite achieve the goal (since it requires at least √ T t correct shares for efficient decoding, which may be much larger than t). We show how to modify the Shamir scheme into an error-correcting secret sharing scheme by using the concept of interleaved Reed Solomon codes. Given our share hiding error-correcting secret sharing scheme, the idea of our protocol (based on the CH1 protocol) is to let one party, Alice, send to the other party Bob encryptions of her database elements using a homomorphic encryption scheme. Using the homomorphic property, Bob can compute the ciphertext of the difference vector between each pair of Alice's and Bob's database words. Bob then homomorphically adds this difference vector to the shares vector of an encryption key, created using the error-correcting secret sharing scheme, and sends the resulting ciphertexts to Alice. As a result, Alice's decryption consists of share vectors having correct shares of Bob's key in the positions where Alice's word matched Bob's word, and, if there are at least t matches, Alice can use the error-correcting property to recover Bob's key (which is then used by Alice to decrypt a ciphertext of Bob's matching word). In order to hide the non-matching elements of Bob, we utilize the randomization technique used in the original FNP private matching protocol (if the element of the Alice dataset is different from the element of the Bob dataset, then this element will be multiplied by a random number). Moreover the share hiding property also hides the location of the matching elements when there are less than t matches. We remark that the original CH1 protocol in [3] did not make use of an error correcting secret sharing scheme, which forced an exponential search by Alice in decoding.
We prove the security of our protocol against passive attacks and explain its efficiency advantages relative to previous protocols.
Private Matching and Set Intersection in FNP
We briefly review the (not fuzzy) private matching and set intersection in [4] , since it is the basis and the extension of the private fuzzy matching discussed in the same paper.
Polynomial Representation of Datasets and Private Matching. Let (K, E, D) be a semantically-secure public-key cryptosystem with additive homomorphic properties, such as Paillier's [9] . Recall that, given E(a), E(b) and a constant c, one can compute
c . There are two parties in the protocol, namely, Alice and Bob. Bob owns a value b, while Alice possesses a dataset A = {a 1 , . . . , a m } and wants to test if b ∈ A or not. Alice does not want to reveal A to Bob, and Bob is unwilling to disclose b to Alice.
The protocol runs as follows.
-Alice first presents her dataset A in the form of a polynomial
-Applied in the homomorphic encryption. Alice encrypts her polynomial P with her public-key. Note that the encrypted polynomial E(P) contains the encryptions of all coefficients α i except α m . Next she sends E(P) to Bob. -Using the homomorphic properties, Bob evaluates the polynomial for his input b according to the following formula
and sends the result E(γP(b) + b) to Alice, where γ is a random non-zero integer. Note that b ∈ A if and only if P(b) = 0. -When Alice receives the cryptogram, she decrypts it and checks if the decrypted message belongs to the set A . If it does she knows the value b, otherwise she knows a random value.
Private Computation of Set Intersection. Suppose Alice and Bob, each has a dataset A = {a 1 , . . . , a m } and B = {b 1 , . . . , b n } respectively, where the set cardinalities m and n are publicly known. Alice wishes to learn the intersection of two sets A ∩ B.
To compute the set intersection, we simply run the above private matching protocol m times in parallel for each of b j ∈ B. In the end, Alice decrypts all the cryptograms and checks if each one is in A, and then establishes A ∩ B.
Related Work on Fuzzy Private Matching
A simple 2-out-of-3 fuzzy matching protocol is given in [4] . We are going to call it the FNP protocol. Although it is flawed (for a detailed analysis refer to [3] ), the approach seems to be sound. Alice has m 3-tuples A 1 , . . . , A m , where A i = (a i1 , a i2 , a i3 ) for i = 1, . . . , m. Let P 1 , P 2 , P 3 be polynomials, such that P is used to encode theth elements (a 1 , . . . , a m ) of the 3-tuples. For each i = 1, . . . , m, Alice chooses a random value γ i = P 1 (a i1 ) = P 2 (a i2 ) = P 3 (a i3 ). Note that for each polynomial P ; = 1, 2, 3, there are m equations so the degree of the polynomials P is at most m − 1.
Next Alice sends (E(P 1 ), E(P 2 ), E(P 3 )) to Bob in the form of encrypted coefficients as in Section 1.1.
For every 3-tuple B j in his dataset of size n, Bob responds to Alice in a manner similar to the protocol in Section 1.1. He computes the encrypted values E(r·(
by encoding B j as b j1 ||b j2 ||b j3 , where r, r and r are random values. If two elements in A i are the same as those in B j , Alice obtains B j in one of the entries after decrypting received ciphertexts.
The generalization of this approach for matching t our of T positions is possible but the resulting protocol is not going to be efficient. Clearly, for each B j ; j = 1, . . . , n, Alice has to check all the combinations T t so both communication and computation complexities of the protocol have the factor T t . Chmielewski and Hoepman [3] extend the FNP protocol and propose two modified protocols that we call CH1 and CH2, both avoiding the T t factor in the communication complexity, but at the expense of a T t factor in computation. The protocol CH1 has quadratic complexity, while CH2 has linear complexity. Unfortunately, the protocol CH2 is insecure, as we explain below. Our work shows how to improve CH1 by further removing the T t factor from the computation. Both protocols CH1 and CH2, are achieved by combining secret sharing [12] and homomorphic encryption. The idea of the CH1 protocol (which forms the basis for our protocol) was already explained in the Introduction. Here we explain the CH2 protocol and why it is insecure.
CH2 Protocol. For each secret vector B j ∈ B, Bob constructs t-out-of-T secret sharing that defines a collection of shares (s j1 , . . . , s jT ). Note that, B j is encoded as b j1 ||b j2 || . . . ||b jT for a convenience. If b j = b j , then s j = s j where j = j . Bob also constructs T polynomials of degree n, P 1 , . . . , P T such that ((P (b 1 ) = s 1 ) and (P (b 2 ) = s 2 ) and , . . . , and (P (b n ) = s n )).
Bob sends all E(P ) to Alice for = 1, . . . , T .
For i = 1, . . . , m and = 1, . . . , T , Alice computes E(P (a i )) using homomorphic properties. Note that P (a i ) = s j if a i = b j . To hide the information about a i , Alice random selects a integer r i and sends E(P (a i )+r i ) to Bob for i ∈ {1, . . . , m}.
Assume that Bob does not want to reveal any information about s j . Bob decrypts
After The above condition implies that the shares v i obtained by Alice in CH2, are related to Bob's shares s j andŝ j as follows:
Assume we are using t-of-T Shamir sharing for the 5 secret sharing vectors {s j } , {ŝ i } for j ∈ {1, 2, 3} and i ∈ {1, 2}. Each sharing has a polynomial of degree ≤ t − 1 associated with it, so we have 5t random variables (coefficients) involved. On the other hand, the above relations give us overall 6(t − 1) known linear equations in these random variables. For sufficiently large t, we have 6(t − 1) > 5t, which means we can find a linear dependency among the equations. The corresponding non-trivial linear combination of the v i 's will be zero, and this can be detected by Alice. On the other hand, for example, if the A 1 and A 2 don't match the B 1 , ...B 3 in any position, the v i 's will be independent and uniformly random, so the tested non-trivial linear combination of them will be zero with negligible probability 1/p. Hence the attack allows Alice to tell when the prescribed condition holds, which is a privacy leak (since the condition involves only t − 1 < t matches between any A i and B j ).
Preliminaries

Additively Homomorphic Encryption
We will utilize an additive homomorphic public key cryptosystem, such as Paillier [9] . Following Adida and Wikstrom [1] , we use the following definition.
Definition 1 ([1]). A cryptosystem (K, E, D) defined by the key generator, encryption and decryption algorithms, respectively, is said to be homomorphic if for every key pair
, the following conditions hold.
The message space M is a subset of an additive abelian group G(M).
The randomizer space R is an additive abelian group. 3. The ciphertext space is an multiplicative abelian group. 4. Given a public key pk, the group operations can be computed in polynomial time. For every m, m ∈ M and r, r ∈ R, the following relation holds
E(m, r) E(m , r ) = E(m + m , r + r ).
The cryptosystem is said to be additive if the message space
M is the additive modular group Z n for some integer n > 1.
When such operations are performed, we require that the resulting ciphertexts be rerandomized for security reasons. During such a process, the ciphertext e of the plaintext m is transformed into e such that e is still a valid cryptogram for the same message m but created with a different random string.
For simplicity, we use E(m) to represent E(r, m) in the rest of the presentation as we assume that there is always a corresponding random string r.
Definitions
We use the usual asymptotic notation O, o, Ω, ω. We say that a function f (s) is neg- Throughout this chapter, the computations are carried out over an arbitrary finite field F. There are two parties Alice I C and Bob I S . Let A = {A 1 , . . . , A m } and B = {B 1 , . . . , B n } be Alice's and Bob's datasets respectively. We call the dataset elements words, and assume that each word consists of an ordered list of T letters from 
Definition 2. Given two words
i = b j }| ≥ t.
Definition 3. Given two datasets A and B as defined above and integer t ≤ T , the t-fuzzy set intersection of datasets A and B, denoted A ∩ t B is defined as
Now we formally define the private fuzzy matching protocol. Let client Alice I C and server Bob I S be two probabilistic polynomial time interactive Turing machines. The interaction of I C and I S yields a result to Alice I C only (server Bob outputs nothing).
We use the standard definitions for passive security of two-party computation, adapted to the private fuzzy matching setting. 
3 Share-Hiding Error-Correcting Secret Sharing from Interleaved Reed-Solomon Codes
For our protocol we introduce a primitive that we call a Share-Hiding Error-Correcting Threshold Secret Sharing Scheme (SHEC-TSS). In this section, we give the relevant coding background and our SHEC-TSS construction from Interleaved Reed-Solomon codes. We start by formulating abstractly the properties we require from a SHEC-TSS scheme.
Our first requirement is random error correction: the secret can be recovered with high probability from a 'noisy' n share vector, in which a subset I of |I| ≥ t shares are correct (the rest being uniformly random), even without knowing the positions of the correct shares. It can be viewed as a strengthening of the usual correctness requirement on a t-of-n threshold scheme, i.e. that any t shares can be used to recover the secret. The formal definition follows. Our second requirement is share hiding: for any fixed secret, any collection I of |I| < t shares is a uniformly random (t − 1)-tuple of elements from the share space. It can be viewed as a strengthening of the usual security requirement for a t-of-n threshold scheme, i.e. that any subset of < t shares gives no information on the secret. The formal definition follows. Remark 1. The name 'share hiding' comes from the following useful implication that is used in our protocol: let I ⊆ [n] be a share subset and let D C,I denote the distribution of noisy n-share vectors generated as in Def. 5, in which the |I| shares indexed by I are correct, and the rest chosen uniformly at random. Then the share hiding property implies that when |I| < t, D C,I is the uniform distribution of n-tuples on the share space, independent of the subset I -hence the correct share subset I is 'hidden'.
Remark 2. The share hiding requirement implies the standard perfect security for t-of-n secret sharing, but the converse is not true in general (see next remark).
Remark 3. It is easy to satisfy the random error correcting property while violating the share hiding property, e.g. share s with a standard t-of-n secret sharing scheme and define the ith share for the new scheme to be the ith share s i for the old scheme concatanated with some redundancy information on s i .
Finally, our third technical requirement is sparsity.
A t-of-n secret sharing scheme SS with share space S is called δ-sparse if a uniformly random n-tuple from S n has probability at most δ to agree with a valid share vector of some secret s on ≥ t positions.
We can now formally define the notion of a SHEC-TSS. 
Then the codeword C(m) ∈ Z n p for this message vector is the list of the first n values of the polynomial P (x):
Since any two distinct polynomials of degree t − 1 agree on at most t − 1 points, the minimum Hamming distance between any two distinct codewords in the code RS n,t,p,z is n − t + 1. This allows deterministic unique error-correction of a noisy codeword if at most (n−t+1)/2 coordinates are incorrect, i.e. at least t = t+(n−t−1)/2 coordinates are correct. However, in our application, we wish to be able to recover the codeword when t is as close to t as possible, where t defines a security threshold (so that t−1 correct coordinates give no information on the codeword), and the incorrect coordinates are uniformly random and independent in Z p . The celebrated Reed-Solomon list-decoding algorithm of Guruswami-Sudan [5] gives a unique solution with high probability in our setting, when the number of correct coordinates t ≥ √ tn, but this is still not sufficiently close to t for our application. 
Then the codeword C(m) ∈ (Z r p ) n for this message is the vector
C(m) = [(P 1 (z 1 ), . . . , P r (z 1 )), . . . , (P 1 (z n ), . . . , P r (z n ))]. For i ∈ [n], we refer to (P 1 (z i ), . . . , P r (z i )) ∈ Z r p
as the ith coordinate of the codeword C(m).
Bleichenbacher, Kiayias and Yung [2] showed the following.
Theorem 1 ([2]). Fix integer parameters t ≤ n ≤ p with p prime and r ≥ n − t + 1, and a vector
z = (z 1 , . . . , z n ) ∈ Z n p with z i = z j for i = j.
There exists an efficient (run-time O(poly(n, log p))) decoding algorithm D for code IRS n,t,p,r,z that, given n, t, p, r, z and a noisy codeword
n with C ∈ IRS n,t,p,r,z and E ∈ (Z r p ) n a noise vector with some subset I of t ≥ t + 1 coordinates fixed to 0 r and the remaining n − t coordinates chosen independently and uniformly at random in Z r p , returns C with probability at least 1 − (n − t )/q over the choice of E and the random coins of D.
The above algorithm works when the number of correct coordinates in Y is t ≥ t + 1, but not for t = t: in that case it is easy to see that C cannot be uniquely decoded from Y if we allow C to be an arbitrary codeword in code IRS n,t,p,r,z . To deal with this problem, our secret sharing scheme introduces additional redundancy by restricting C to a subset of codewords whose r polynomials all share the same constant coefficient (the secret), i.e. we are using a modified interleaved Reed Solomon code IRS n,t,p,r,z in which the codewords satisfy P (0) = P 1 (0) for all ∈ [r]. We also make sure that z i = 0 for i ∈ [r]. Below, we show that a natural adaptation of the decoding algorithm from Theorem 1 to the code IRS n,t,p,r,z provides a unique solution with high probability even for t = t, as required.
We formalize our construction of a random-error correcting secret sharing scheme as follows.
Definition 11. Let p be a prime number, r ≥ 1 an integer, t < n < p, and let z = (z 1 , . . . , z n ) ∈ Z p be a vector of n distinct non-zero elements in Z p . The t-ofn threshold secret sharing scheme IRS n,t,p,z,r over the field Z p with threshold t and n shares is defined as follows. Given a secret s ∈ Z p , the dealer chooses r random polynomials P (x) of degree ≤ t − 1 with P (0) = s for ∈ [r]. The share vector C(s) for secret s is z 1 ), . . . , P r (z 1 )) , . . . , (P 1 (z n ) , . . . , P r (z n ))], where for i ∈ [n], the ith share is (P 1 (z 
We now present our main result.
Theorem 2. Let IRS n,t,p,z,r be the t-of-n secret sharing scheme defined above. If r ≥ n − t + 1, the scheme is a SHEC-TSS with error δ ≤ n/p.
Proof. The share hiding property follows from the fact that the collection of t < t valid shares c i, plus the secret s imposes t + 1 ≤ t constraints of the form P (0) = s and P (z i ) = c i, for t distinct non-zero z i , on the degree ≤ t − 1 polynomials P . Since there is a unique solution for P passing through any t given points, there are exactly p t−t −1 ≥ 1 possible choices for each polynomial P satisfying the given constraints, regardless of the values of the c i, ; the result follows by the uniformly random choice of the P .
We now establish the δ-sparse property. Fix a subset I ⊆ [n] with |I| = t. The probability that a uniformly random vector Y ∈ (Z r p ) n matches any valid share vector C of IRS n,t,p,r,z on the shares with indices in I is 1/p r−1 . This is because there is a unique polynomial P 1 of degree ≤ t − 1 satisfying P 1 (z i ) = y i,1 for i ∈ I, and unique polynomials P 2 , . . . , P r of degree ≤ t − 1 satisfying P (0) = P 1 (0) and P (z i ) = c i, for i ∈ I − {i * }, where i * is one element of I. Hence, the random vector Y will match the valid codeword C also on the i * th share if and only if P (z i * ) = c i * , for ≥ 2, which holds with probability 1/p r−1 . By taking a union bound over all subsets I of size t we conclude that δ-sparsity holds with δ ≤ n t /p r−1 = n n−t /p r−1 ≤ (n/p) n−t ≤ n/p, using r ≥ n − t + 1 and n n−t ≤ n n−t . Now we prove the random error-correcting property by explaining the appropriate modifications to the algorithm of Theorem 1 and its analysis in [2] . The decoding algorithm accepts as input n, t, p, z, r and a noisy share vector Y = (y 1 , . . . , y n ) with where C = (c 1 , . . . , c n ) is the share vector for some secret s using scheme IRS n,t,p,z,r , and I is a subset of [n] with |I| ≥ t. The decoding algorithm does not know |I|, and therefore tries to decode using a guess t for |I|, until it succeeds. The algorithm works as follows.
-Repeat the following for t = t, t + 1, . . . , n:
• Randomize: Select r random polynomials
, and set y i, :
and ∈ [r].
• Solve: Find a polynomial E(x) of degree ≤ n − t with constant term 1, and r polynomials m (x) for ∈ [r] of degree ≤ n−t +t−1 such that the following linear system of equations is satisfied:
• If the solution m 1 , . . . , m r , E to (1) is unique and m (x) is divisible by E(x) for ∈ [r], then compute polynomials
, and return share vector C determined by those polynomials (with P 1 (0) = m 1 (0) − s being the corresponding secret), and terminate.
-If no solution is found for any t ∈ {t, . . . , n}, terminate and return failure.
We note that the algorithm in [2] works in essentially the same way, except that it does not impose the constraints m (0) = m 1 (0) for ∈ [r]. The run-time of each iteration of the algorithm is dominated by the Gaussian elimination procedure for solving the linear system of equations over Z p of dimension ≤ r · n, which can be done in time O((rn) 3 log 2 p). Thus the overall run-time is O(n · (rn) 3 log 2 p), which is polynomial in the input length, as required.
The randomization step randomizes the r solution polynomials P 1 , . . . , P r corresponding to the vector Y , i.e. after this step, we know that there exists a subset I ⊆ [n] of size |I| ≥ t and r random polynomials P 1 , . . . , P r of degree ≤ t − 1 such that y i, = P (z i ) for i ∈ I and ∈ [r], and y i, uniformly random for i ∈ [n] − I and ∈ [r], and P (0) = P 1 (0) = s + s for ∈ [r]. When t ≤ |I|, the polynomials P give rise to the following desired solution m * 1 , . . . , m * r , E * to system (1):
However, note that when t < |I|, the system (1) will not have a unique solution, so the algorithm will increment t until it reaches t = |I| (indeed, when t < |I|, one can take any subset I of I of size |I | = t and construct a distinct solution to (1) associated with I by replacing I with I in the above definition of E * ). Our goal is to show that when t = |I|, the above desired solution is indeed the unique one. We note that (1) is a linear system with r · n equations and r · (n − t + t) + (n − t ) − (r − 1) variables. A necessary condition for the system to have a unique solution is that it is not under determined; that is, the number of equations is at least equal to the number of variables. It is easy to see that if r ≥ n − t + 1, the system (1) is not under determined when t ≥ t (whereas the system in [2] has r − 1 additional variables, and is not under determined only for t ≥ t + 1).
We now explain how to modify the argument in [2] to show that when the system (1) is not under determined, it has a unique solution with probability at least 1 − (n − t)/p over the random choice of the P for ∈ [r] and y i, for i ∈ [n] − I and ∈ [r] -we call those the random variables.
The argument works in three steps as follows. Starting from the matrix A of the system (1), the first step removes some rows from A to obtain a square matrixÂ. The second step is a rearrangement of the rows ofÂ to give a matrixÂ * . The final step is to show that the determinant ofÂ * is a non-zero polynomial of degree ≤ n − t in the random variables, by showing that the determinant is non-zero for some choice of values for the random variables. It then follows by the Schwartz Lemma [11] that the determinant ofÂ * is non-zero (and hence the original system has a unique solution) with probability at least 1 − (n − t)/p over the uniform choice of the random variables.
First
Step. The matrix A for our system (1) has the following form (where we arrange the variables with the n−t +t coefficients of m 1 first, followed by the n−t +t−1 non-constant coefficients of m for = 2, . . . , r, and finally the non-constant coefficients of E):
M is the n × n − t + t − 1 submatrix of M with the first of column of M (all ones) removed, K is a n × (n − t + t) matrix whose elements are all zero except for the leftmost column whose entries are all 1, and for ∈ [r], M is a n × (n − t ) matrix whose (i, j)th element M [i, j] is related to the (i, j)th element ofM as follows:
Since the number of rows of A exceeds the number of columns by N = r · (t − t + 1)−(n−t +1), we need to remove N rows from A to make it square. The rows of A are naturally divided into r blocks of n rows each, indexed from 1 to r from top to bottom. Similarly to [2] , we remove from A the bottom t − t + 1 ≥ 1 rows of the last c < r blocks of A (note that this makes the c diagonal block matrices in the corresponding blocks, square matrices of dimension n − t + t − 1), where c = N/(t − t + 1) . This leaves N mod (t − t + 1) remaining rows to remove -they are removed from the bottom of block r − c ≥ 1. This gives the square matrixÂ.
Second
Step. In this step, we make the diagonal block matrices of the top r − c blocks square (and hence all block matrices along the diagonal square, thanks to Step 1) by swapping some rows from those blocks to the bottom of the matrix. As in [2] , we assume, without loss of generality, that I = {n − t + 1, . . . , n}, and we define the surplus s of block ∈ [r − c] ofÂ as the number of rows that should be swapped from the th block to the bottom of the matrix, in order to make the the corresponding diagonal block matrix square, i.e. s 1 = t − t − x 1 and s = t − t + 1 − x for ≥ 2, where x is the number of rows removed from block in Step 1. We observe that, since matrixÂ is square and the number of columns of the M matrices on the right is n − t , we have ∈[r−c] s = n − t . We swap rows 1, . . . , s 1 of block 1 to the bottom, then rows s 1 + 1, . . . , s 1 + s 2 of block 2 to the bottom, and so on until rows 
where N Step 3. We show that det(Â * ) is non-zero polynomial D in the random variables of degree n − t . The degree follows from the fact that only the last n − t columns ofÂ * depend on the random variables, and each element in those columns is linear in the random variables. To show that D is a non-zero polynomial, we show that it evaluates to a non-zero value for certain values of the random variables. Namely, we set the polynomials P = 1 for ∈ [r] (note that this satisfies the constraint that all P have the same constant coefficient). This implies y i, = 1 for all i ∈ {n − t + 1, . . . , n} (since I = {n − t + t, . . . , b}) and ∈ [r]. We also set y i, = 1 for all rows i, which have not been moved to the bottom of the matrix in Step 2. On the other hand, we set y i, = 0 for all rows i, which have been moved to the bottom in Step 2 (note that these rows have i ≤ n − t by construction, therefore the corresponding random variables y i, can take on arbitrary values, independent of the P 's). For this setting of the random variables, we have that M 1 is equal to the submatrix of N 1 consisting of columns 2 to n − t + 1, and for ≥ 2, M is equal to the submatrix of N consisting of the first n − t columns. We also have thatM is the zero matrix.
We now perform elementary row operations onÂ * (with the above setting of the random variables) to zero out all elements below the square block matrices N 1 , . . . , N r along the diagonal. Since N for ∈ [r] is a Vandermonde (or scaled Vandermonde) matrix, and the z i 's are distinct and non-zero, then N is full rank and has non-zero determinant (it is well known that a Vandermonde matrix relative to z 1 , . . . , z k has a non-zero determinant when the z i are distinct; the scaled Vandermonde matrix can be obtained by multiplying each row of a Vandermonde matrix by the corresponding z i , so the scaled Vandermonde matrix has a non-zero determinant when the z i are all non-zero and distinct). First, we eliminate all 1 elements in the first column ofÂ * . Since N 1 is full rank, we can express each row (1, 0, . . . , 0) of K as a linear combination of the rows of N 1 . Subtracting this linear combination of the first n − t rows ofÂ * from the rows below, we eliminate the 1 elements in the first column of these rows. Furthermore, since M 1 consists of the submatrix of N 1 except the first column, this operation has no effect on the elements of M for ≥ 2. Next, we similarly eliminate the elements in V 1 by expressing each row of V 1 as a linear combination of the rows of N 1 and subtracting and independently in Z N , and w ijk is chosen uniformly and independently in Z s where s = N/p . In step 4(c), the decrypted plaintexts in Z N would be reduced modulo p before proceeding with the decoding in Z p . With this modification, for the case when A i is not fuzzy t-equal to B j in the simulation proof of Theorem 3, the noisy share vectors C ij decrypted by Alice in Step 4 of the real protocol have coordinates uniformly random in Z N for unmatching positions and coordinates uniformly random in Z k·p for matching positions. The latter are statistically indistinguishable from uniform on Z N if N/p is sufficiently large (namely the statistical distance is ≤ mnT p/N ); thus ensuring that N > 2 k mnT p, maintains statistical security of the protocol (the simulation consists of choosing the coordinates ofC ij uniformly and independently at random from Z N ). If the condition p d < p does not hold, a possible solution is to hash the letters from Z p d to Z p using a collision-resistant hash function, and then apply the previous protocol.
Efficiency. The communication and computation complexity of our scheme are summarised in Table 1 , which also includes the values for previous protocols. Table 1 . Comparison of protocol efficiency with previous protocols, with m = n, pk and sym are the ciphertext lengths of the homomorphic encryption scheme E and symmetric encryption E, respectively, k is the security parameter. Also, T E , T D , T H , T A denote the encryption/decryption time and time for a homomorphic scalar multiplication/homomorphic addition for E, T E = TE + T D + T H , and T sym denotes the encryption time for E. Only dominant terms (proportional to n 2 ) are shown.
Compared to the CH1 protocol [3] , our protocol dramatically improves computation by a factor O( T t /poly(T )) but has larger communication by a linear factor O(T ) (due to our use of error correcting secret sharing). We also compare our protocol to two other protocols based on the generic Yao 'garbled circuit' protocol for two-party computation. Since one can choose pk ≈ log p, we see that compared to the generic Yao protocol [13] , our protocol's communication is roughly a factor O(T / sym ) times that of the Yao protocol, hence we expect an improvement in the case T = O( sym ). Although this may not be a huge improvement, we believe it is still a useful, simpler and more natural alternative to the Yao protocol for this application. Note that Yao's protocol is generic and applies to any Boolean ciruit; to apply it to our problem, we represent the fuzzy matching function as a boolean circuit having the n 2 database words as input. Such a circuit can be implemented with O(n 2 T (log p + log T )) 2-input gates, giving the complexity estimate in Table 1 (in practice, one could use the Fairplay compiler [7] to generate the circuit). The last row in Table 1 corresponds to the fuzzy matching protocol of Indyk and Woodruff [6] . The latter protocol has a dominant communication complexity term (the n 2 term) independent of T , but uses (as a subprotocol) the Yao protocol applied to the decryption circuit D of a homomorphic encryption scheme, which typically has complexity T D = O( 3 pk ), where pk is the length of the public key. Thus we expect our protocol to be more efficient in the case T 2 = O(k 2 pk ).
Conclusion
We presented a novel share hiding random error-correcting secret sharing scheme based on interleaved Reed-Solomon codes, and showed how to apply it to construct a simple protocol for private fuzzy matching. We believe our secret sharing scheme may find further cryptographic applications in future. The size of shares in our t-of-n scheme is O((n − t)k), where k is the length of the secret. An interesting open problem is to find alternative constructions with smaller shares, as this will improve our protocol's communication efficiency further.
